2Q.(bsl or unAaerstantractaing, the types of hypotheses that subjects bring to bear on the learning process, and the types of processes that need to be studied in order to understand the psychology of learning. One thing concerns me about our understanding of the memory process.
Nhen I learn new materialsuch as the content of the papers presentee at this symposium--almost none of this learning requires the kind of attentive rehearsal processes so well studied in the psychOlogical literature on snort-and long-term memory. I listen. I understand.
And that is that. No rehearsal.
No formal attempt to categorize or organize. Simply understanding. If I fail to understand, then I will also fail to remember. I have been examining the learning of complex material in an attempt to determine the psychological processes that are acting to ensure proper retention.
(CoMplex materials are those that require days or weeks to acquire.)
Again, I find that the traditional acquisition processes which I have heretofore been studying are of little importance. In this paper, I make a.step towaros a description of the mechanisms that do operate in these situations.
One thing seems to be clear: in order to learn material for later use, it helps to have that material 'organized in an appro priate manner. If this is done, or if the process of organizing the material is part of the learning task, then the permanent acquisition
of that material appears to be done reasonably effortlessly. Other wise, effort is needed to ensure its permanent retention. The psychological literature shows many examples of the efficient learning that can occur when organizational processes accompany exposure to material--even when no formal attempt is made to retain the material.
Two Types_ of Rehearsal
In the earlier theories of the way that information was trans ferred from shortterm to longterm memory, it was thought that rehearsal played an important role (for example, the mode). of Waugh & Norman, 1965) . Today, it appears that the argument is not so simple.
Rehearsal of an item appears to help strengthen its memory representation, but in ways that n,eed not be useful for later recall. Craik & Watkins (in press), Bjork (in press) and woodward, Eijork & Jongeward (in press) have shown how repeated rehear sal of some material need not lead to an increase in the ability of a . subject to recall that material. More important, they have found it necessary to distinguish between two types, of rehearsal processes: one that seems primarily effective in maintaining the item within shortterm memory, the other that seems designed-to aid in its later 'retrievability. Let me call these two forms rehearsal for maintenance and for accessibility.
The paradigmatic experiment looks like this (after Woodward et al.) :
subject is shown a list of words, some of which he is doing to be asked to remember for a future test, others of which will not be tested, but he is not toles which is the case until some interval of time has passed from that item's presentation (nothing else is presented in that interval, however the initial presentation and the signal did not affect the-ability of the subject to recall the material at a later test, whereas the length of the interval that occurred after the signal and before the presentation of the next item did make a difference. This fact alone would seem to suagest that during the initial period, subjects main tainea the item in STM without transferring it to LTM. This is not completely correct, however, because when the subjects were tested on a recognition test, the earlier interval did make a difference.
Thus, we appear to have a rehearsal process that strengthens the memory trace as measured by a recognition measure, but that has no effect on memory as measured by a recall measure.
Any theory that postulates a role for rehearsal as a method for strengthening memory representation is partly correct, but fails to recognize that subjects _can perform different kinds of processes durihg rehearsal. Moreover, it fails to take into account the distinctions between memory structures that are tested by tests that use recall techniques and by tests that use recognition.
Endel Tulving (see Tulving 8 Madigan, 1970) These would appear to be the important questions that must be faced if ever we are to claim to understand human cognitive processes.
Note that it is possible to reformulate the learning of the traditional material studied in memory research.
When subjects are able to devise encoaing strategies for the material, then they find that retention becomes easy, -almost auto matic.
Many of the mnemonic systems in use by those who practice the art of memory make use of the fact that given a suitable encod ing, no real effort need be exerted to remember material. mnemonic devices, the trick is to discover the appropriate mnemonic:
once discovered, the learner can simply pass on to the next item with little or no further processing.
I will illustrate the problem of learning by considering two particular problems. First, I consider the teaching of a computer programming language.
I choose this topic only because it is convenient it seems to be at about the right level of difficulty to guide our studies.
It is very simple. Someone who knows computer programming but who has never seen this particular language can Usually learn it simply by reading the list of commands, a process that may take less than five minutes. Yet, students who have no background in programming sometimes take weeks to learn it. Thus, the topic is well define, it is simple, yet it is complex enough to be a good vehicle-for study.
Second, I consider a problem of rule induction from the tradi tional literature on problem solving: Luchins' (1942) water jug
problem. This provides a typical paradigm for learning, even tnough it is not normally viewed in that light.
ELilb..
The programming language called FLOW was developed by
Professor Jeffrey Raskin at the University of California, San Diego for use in teaching computer programming to students in the visual arts, students who both had little knowledge of science and mathe matics and who also disliked these subjects. FLOW is unique in several ways. First, it has been designed to simplify the process of entering information into the computer. At any point in the program, only the typewriter keys which lead to legal commands are operative. When a key which would lead to an illegal character is depressed, it has no effect.
In addition, by a system called "typing amplification," whenever the user has typed a sufficient number of characters that the computer can unambiguously interpret which command is meant, the entire command appears on the screen without waiting for.the student to finish. Thus, by these two features, the most common problems for the beginner are eli minated: typing errors and difficulty with the keyboard. In addi tion, we have modified the system to add several other useful features for our studies.
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The command set of FLOW is illustrated in Table 1 .
In this
Insert Table 1 about here table, the part of the command that the student must type is underlined.
The language is essentially selfexplanatory, except perhaps for the commands that refer to -"IT." IT is the name of a pointer that refers to a single letter in a string of text (the text is always the "TEXT IS ...".statement that was encountered most recently in the stream of processing). When first, invoked, the ITpointer refers to the first letter of the text. Each time the command GET IT is used, the pointer moves one letter to the right Table 1 The FLOW Language
The student only has to type the underlined letters.
(Some commands fall into more than one category,, and so they are repeated.)
CONTROL STATEMENTS
If it is go to 235
If counter is 42 go to 240
Go to 10 This simple language allows many fundamental properties of programming to be taught while maintaining a simple structure. The basic language contains a set of only 12 different commands.
In addition, there are 5 system commands, as well as some simple conventions used for typing line numbers and correcting lines.
The program just illustrated requires the use of only 9 different commands (including two different forms of the PRINT commands).
In addition, the student should know at least 3 system commands or concepts: How to LIST a program, how to RUN a program, how to type in statements and how to correct errors.
Clearly, however, there is more to understanding the language than these simple lists of concepts. Here is a statement of a typical problem:
You are given three jugs of water:
one holds exactly 21 gallons, one holds exactly 127 gallons, and one holds exactly 3 gallons.
Your task is to determine how you can end up with exactly 100 gallons.
To solve this problem, the subject needs to know (or assume) that water is available from an unlimited source. He must also. know what it means to fill and empty a container. In the original experiment by Luchins, this particular problem followed one that involved only two containers and in which the experimenter had explained the answer if the subject had not gotten it after 2 minutes.
(The answer to this three jug problem was given if the subject could not discover it in 3 minutes.) After these two problems were pre sented, the experimental series of 9 similar problems followed.
To solve the problem, the subject must first understand the operations that are available, including the conditions for their application.and the results that will occur. Notice that the opera tions themselves are not stated as a part of the problem.4
Basic ally there are three types of operations: to pour from one container to another; to fill a container; and to empty a container. These are describe° in Table 2 .5
Insert Table 2 here
No single one of the operations of Table 2 will solve the problems to reach a solution, the basic operations must be combined in some way.
To do this requires a meta-operation, a statement about wnat operations are permitted on the operations themselves.
Finally, the meta-operations may yield a combination of.operations that yield the answer. Call this sequence a strategy.
In the actual experiment conducted by Luchins, after he gave his subjects this three jug problem, he gave them four more, where each of the five problems' could be solved by the application of the same strategy:
* Fill the largest jar.
(Empty the other two.)
* Pour from the largest jar to the medium jar.
* Pour from the largest jar to the smallest jar.
* Empty the smallest jar.
* Pour from the laraest to the smallest.
The desired amount is now left in the largest jar.
The problem I am interested in is how subjects were able t derive that sequence. To Luchins, that was not of much interest.
Rather, he wanted to demonstrate the fact that once a strategy had been developed, the subject would follow it. Thus, after the five tnree jug problems, he asked them to solve this one:
You are given a 23, a 49, and .a 3 gallon container.
Your task is to get 20 gallons. Table 2 Possible Operations for the Water Jug Problem Let x be the name of a container. Then C(x) represents the capacity of container x and W(x) represents the amount of water contained in x.
Letyx)bethefinalstateofW(x)andW.(x) the initial state. Rarely does a subject who has experienced tne entire sequence of problems simply pour from the 23 gallon container to the 3 gallon one.
To Lucnins, this was the detrimental effect of set or ain,stailung.
I believe it to illustrate quite a different point: the efficient use of strategies.
I suspect that the development of a new strategy by application of metarules requires more effort than the following of a previously determines strategy. If this is true, then the subjects were minimizing their mental effort by solving this new problem simply by applying a strategy that was known to be successful.
The solution of a problem requires a number of different steps and.concepts. The problem must be understood. The various permissible operations must be determined, and they in turn must be understood. A set of metaoperations must be applied to form a strategy.
Finally, if there is to be any learning, successful strategies must be recoanized and used again, perhaps by adding newly developed strategies to the set of operations tnat are permissible.
Is
Learning FLOW Now let us return to the examination of the computer programming language.
To program, it is necessary that the student acquire some knowledge of how commands may be combined. Before this can be done, the student must understand what computer languages ana programs are. The student must understand the problem he is to solve, he must know the specific commands of the language, and he must understand the metaoperations that characterize the art of programming. Finally, he must acquire specific strategies for specific classes of problems.
The difficulties of learning to program are almost completely divorced from the formal difficulty of I'learntFign or of acquisition into memory. The hard task is the task of understanding: once that is accomplished, memory follows automatically.
Propositional and Algorithmic Knowledge
In his recent stuaies of learning, Greeno has considered issues similar to those discussed here (see Greeno, 1973 But even if the distinction is not clear, it is still useful.
Consider the FLO language: To be able to solve the problem or printing the number of E's in a sentence, the student must understa.:d both conceptual ana algorithmic ideas. He must know the ccnceptual knowledge carried by the commands (see Table 1 ).
In addition, he must be aware of the ways in which these statements are entered into the computer, and how the program is actually executed. He must also have certain types of algorithmic knowledge, for example:
* How to do tests for proper conditions. * How to ao loops, or iterations.
* How to properly sequence instructions.
Student Presumptions
I have already remarked on the fact that even a naive learner starts with certain basic assumptions and predetermined strategies.
Thus, upon learning the rules of a new game, the adult player plays sensibly even on his first attempt. This beginning knowledge may not be a virtue. One major difficulty in teaching a topic is to overcome students' prior concepts. When students have difficulty in acquiring a concept, it often means they are attempting to acquire the wrong one. Consider these examples:
* The instructor in the normal university course on FLOW (Prcfessor Raskin) studiously avoids telling the students that what they are doino has anything to ao with computers until long after they have learnea to program (the word "program"
is not used either). Otherwise, he says, a student who dislikes science may invoke the one firm conceptual statement of knowledge he has about computers: He can't understana them. This is a selffulfilling prophecy. Clearly, this attribute of the problem was thought to be important oy the student even though it was of absolutely no interest to us.
These examples show something of the nature of the hypotheses that students bring to bear on the learning task. In some sense, these prior hypotheses are at the crux of the problem. To the student, the task is very much one of concept formation. He must somehow grasp the concepts that are involved in the situation. No matter that the experimenter is on his side, trying to help. The subject still must hypothesize and test, hopefully managing to separate the irrelevant from the relevant.
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These errors of students are comical at first, but they are serious.
They indicate that the students are struggling to perform the appropriate task, but that they have grasped at the incorrect concepts.
The problem is akin to that faced in the concept formation literature when incorrect hypotheses often cause a subject to fail to get the appropriate classification chosen by the experimenter (See Trabasso 8, Bower, 1968; or Levine,1971) . We could argue, in fact, that this is a problem in attention, with the student select ing for attention in the learning situation inappropriate attributes of the situation. Thus, the student who is attempting to print a symbol by comoining two parentheses is working efficiently at the wrong aspect of the problem, one that in concept formation terms is simply called an irrelevant dimension. Once the appropriate concept is discovered, then it must be remembered, of course, but this learning is probably more like the simple allornone learning discussed by Bjork (1968) for the acquisition of simple strategies than it is of the more laborious type of learning by repeated trials that is so often discussed in the literature on short and longterm memory.
The concepts involved here, of course, differ considerably from those normally studied within the concept formation literature.
Moreover, the learning situation differs from the other in that the experimenter is desperately attempting to help the student acquire the relevant concepts. Nonetheless that analogy seems meaningful.
What Should We Teach?
If conventional theories of learning and memory have taught us one thing, it is that factual knowledge is difficult -o learn:
it becomes a lesson in pairedassociate learning. Functional knowledge is different. Once the function is understood, the knowledge appears with relative ease. it is derived, not memorized.
The functions are mnemonic devices, and so it is function that we should be teaching.
There still remains the question of why: Why is functional knowledge easier to learn than factual knowledge? There is one reasonably obvious possible reason. A function has more constraints on its possible relations to other concepts than does a list of concepts.
Earlier (Norman, 1973) , I made the argument that new material is learned most efficiently when integrated within the network of old knowledge by means of a web structure rather than a linear process.
That is, the learning should add the new material by attaching a conceptual framework within memory to the old, previously acquired material.
Then that framework should be elaborated upon, filling in 
The Near Miss
One very important contribution to the study of learning is provided by Winston (1973) . What is an arch? A tower?
A pedestal? Winston worried about how a syStem could come to learn these concepts simply by observing structures built from blocks while oeing told what they were. Suppose the task is to learn an "arch."
Tne scheme he devised is that of noticing (nearly) all relations among the blocks, and using that set to define an arch.
but suppose ,the next example fulfilled the relations and yet was not an arch. This is the critical learning step, and for Winston, the nature of these examples was very important. The learning trials should consist of a carefully selected set of positive examples along with negative examples that were near misses.
The learner forms the appropriate concept by comparing his acquired structure with that for the near miss, noticing the critical distinctions that cause the example to lie outside the definition.
Winston derived a working example of how concepts might be learned (his system is a working computer program). His most important contribution, however, might be in his conside-ation of the importance of the trainingsequence, and in particular, the importance of the near miss. What Winston appears to have done is to provide teaching techniques that make clear just which attributes of the proolem are the relevant ones. Thus, he combines an active learning process with subtle guides for the direction that the learner must follow.
Toward a New Learning Theory
We must learn to characterize the strategies that are acquired by students. When a subject is engaged in a learning situation, he brings to bear not only his knowledge of the subject matter, but also his idea of the expectations of the situation. He has some overall concept of the situation he is in, he has a concept or the performance expected of him, and he has some idea of the appropriate types of operations he can perform. Finally, he has to have some idea of the basic commands or operations available to solve the problems put before him.
Clearly new knowledge must be well integrated within old if it is to be acquired easily and effectively. But this statement hides much.
For one, the knowledge consists often of processes and routines, not static concepts. The memory theories developed in recent years say little or nothing of how anything other than concepts are acquired. For another, the fact that subjects maintain hierarchical levels of strategies and metastrategies means that the description of the integration of knowledge will have to account
for the different levels of activity that is involved.
Two aspects of recent studies of memory seem especially relevant.
First is the type of activities that subjects perform during the accessibility form of rehearsal which help that material become available for both later recognition and recall.
(A comparison with what subjects do in the maintenance form of rehearsal would be productive.) Second is continued study of the notion of "depth of processing," most especially with the aim of determining why depth is so often correlated with good retention.
New knowledge seems easier to acquire when it is learned as a process than when it is learned as a collection of facts. All these features: of hypotheses, of process learning, of strategies, of incorporating new within old must be studied in order that we can learn about the process of learning. The experimental studies are carried out by me and Donald
Gentner. The system programming has been performed by Mark Wallen.
3.
To the reader who believes this to be too simple a language to take seriously, I urge him to attempt these two problems.
a. Print "yes" if the last two letters of the text are "iem or meim; print no otherwise.
The program should print "yes" for del, die, diie and diei, and "no" for died, dice and deii.
b. Print the first word that has an "E".
If the text is "This is a sample sentence ", the program should print "sample".
4.
It is interesting to study now a subject is able to expand the statement of the problem into the set of conditions necessary to solve it. A reasonable amount of world knowledge is required. In my informal. experiments, young children--around 7 to 8 years--tend to disallow the operation of emptying a container onto the ground. They tend to add another presupposition to the problem; either that water cannot be wasted, or that "backup" is not allowed.
5.
Clearly there are alternative ways of stating these operations. The rules could be more general, with the three rules stated here subsumed under a single "pour31 operation. They could also be more specific, so that for the three jug problem there would be three "fills' operations, three "empty" operations, and six -"pours." Although the form does not matter, the content does: the knowledge in Table 2 must be known in order to solve the problem.
